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INTRODUCTION
T ECHNOLOGY scaling has allowed transistors to become smaller, faster and more power-efficient. However, device miniaturization has increased interconnect power and delay to such an extent that it is presenting a significant bottleneck to further performance and energyefficiency gains. Moreover, it is expected in the near future that technology scaling will cease to reduce the cost per transistor [1] . These trends motivate the need for innovative approaches to reduce interconnect power/delay and at the same time increase transistor density, which has driven chip design into the third dimension. 3D integration is a promising technology to overcome many obstacles that have caused Moore's Law to slow down in recent years.
3D Integration technology expands circuit design into the third dimension by vertically stacking multiple functional device layers and interconnecting them using Through-Silicon-Vias (TSVs), as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The vertical stacking structure is an attractive option for increasing transistor density. It also reduces interconnect wirelength hence scaling down power and delay. The reduction in interconnect wirelength can be leveraged by implementing a more highly connected architecture without increasing power or delay. Moreover, 3D integration allows separate layers to be fabricated using disparate materials and technologies. Heterogeneous integration optimizes existing System-on-Chip (SoC) designs by integrating components of different novel technologies into a single chip.
As 3D IC is becoming a promising technology for nextgeneration chip design, researchers have started to investigate it from a hardware security perspective. In general, hardware security research can be classified into three major categories: 1) preventing piracy, overbuilding, and malicious modification of a design during outsourced fabrication; 2) mitigating side-channel based secret information leakage; and 3) ensuring trustworthy operation of software through hardware-based security mechanisms such as trustworthy computer architectures and novel security primitives. While 3D integration is initially designed to improve chip performance, it has presented various potential in countering aforementioned security threats with its built-in security advantages:
Split fabrication: With 3D integration, a designer can choose a portion of layers at his discretion and fabricate them in a trusted foundry while outsourcing the rest to untrusted foundries for low-cost fabrication. This split fabrication process prevents potential piracy, overbuilding or malicious modifications of a design during outsourced fabrication. Stacking structure: The stacking structure and highdensity nature of 3D integration offer a natural defense for side-channel attacks as it adds significantly more complexity for an attacker to extract a meaningful signal from the complicated background noise. Moreover, reverse-engineering becomes challenging since hardware designs can be protected inside the firmly stacked substrates. Heterogeneous integration for security: With 3D heterogeneous integration, novel non-CMOS security primitives can be integrated with CMOS processor to achieve a comprehensive system with optimal security and performance. 3D integration not only boosts chip performance but also unlocks new opportunities to thwart security threats which occur in different phases of an IC's life cycle. But at the same time, it brings new reliability and security challenges for both design and fabrication of its own. The objective of this paper is to survey the current state of 3D integration based security applications and highlight potential security opportunities and challenges of this technology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. An overview of 3D integration technology is firstly provided, including its fabrication process (Section 2), architectures (Section 3), and its design flow and challenges (Section 4). Then, Section 5 highlights the security advantages of 3D IC and its opportunities in countering various security threats. Section 6 discusses potential security vulnerabilities in 3D ICs. Section 7 summarizes distinct characteristics of 3D ICs and investigate the security considerations in a securityaware 3D IC design. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
3D IC FABRICATION
3D integration is a technology that vertically integrates multiple layers of devices and metals to create a single highperformance chip, referred to as 3D IC. Currently, 3D IC can be fabricated in two ways: 1) die stacking based 3D fabrication and 2) monolithic 3D fabrication. Die stacking based 3D fabrication [2] utilizes conventional 2D IC fabrication process to fabricate each layer separately on different substrates and then interconnects them using Through-Silicon-Vias (TSV). On the contrary, monolithic 3D fabrication [3] grows multiple device layers vertically on the same substrate in a serial order, so it doesn't require alignment, thinning and bonding. Compared to the monolithic approach, die stacking approach can exploit existing fabrication processes and hence has lower fabrication cost and less time to market. Therefore, die stacking based 3D fabrication has received more attention from both academia and industry. Two key processes of the die stacking based 3D IC fabrication flow are TSV manufacturing and die stacking.
TSV Manufacturing
TSV is the most crucial element in die stacking based 3D integration. It can be used for signal communication, thermal conducting and power delivery. TSV is typically made of copper or tungsten. Its manufacturing process is similar to the process for a contact hole, except that TSV requires a much deeper hole that goes all the way through the substrate. In general, via-first and via-last are two mainstream TSV fabrication techniques [4] . The via-first approach etches into the silicon to form the TSV hole before processing the devices while the via-last approach does the opposite. Although two approaches differ in process details, they share a similar TSV formation process, which consists of via etching, dielectric isolation, via filling (metallization) and chemical-mechanical polishing (CMP) [5] . The performance and reliability of TSVs are related to their physical parameters, such as height, diameter and pitch size. A TSV example is of 5 mm diameter and 50 mm height at a 10 mm minimum pitch [6] .
Die Stacking
Die stacking facilitates the integration of multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous dies that are designed and manufactured separately. Here we introduce the stacking process for two common configurations of 3D ICs: stacked 3D IC and interposer-based 3D IC, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Stacked 3D IC integrates multiple dies by stacking and bonding them vertically, as shown in Fig. 1a . After substrate thinning and TSV manufacturing, multiple dies are aligned precisely and bonded vertically using Cu/CuSn microbumps. Various die stacking methods have been developed and in general, the main difference among these methods is related to the choice of stacking orientation [7] . The "faceto-face" approach bonds the via stubs in metal layers (face) of two dies directly, hence it doesn't require TSVs to connect two dies. The only TSVs that penetrate the substrate are those that are connected to external I/O pins. However, this approach only supports two-layer 3D integration. The alternative, the "face-to-back" approach bonds the metal layer (face) of one die to the TSVs in the substrate (back) of another die. Arbitrary layers of dies can be stacked vertically using the "face-to-back" approach, as long as the system meets its thermal and power constraints.
Interposer-based 3D IC, also known as 2.5D IC, is another configuration of 3D IC. It places multiple dies side-by-side and stacks them on a silicon interposer through fine-pitch micro-bumps. The structure of a 2.5D IC is shown in Fig. 1b . The interposer contains both horizontal chip-scale interconnect wires between dies as well as vertical interconnect TSVs to external I/O pins. The absence of TSVs in the dies of 2.5D IC makes it easier to design and fabricate than TSVpenetrated stacked 3D IC.
3D CPU ARCHITECTURE
3D integration offers many new opportunities for high-performance CPU architectures. In the following sections, we discuss some examples of 3D CPU architectures that take advantage of the performance improvements in 3D ICs.
3D Memory on Chip
Heterogeneous integration involves the stacking of circuits fabricated in disparate manufacturing processes. Such an integration approach can provide massive bandwidth improvements between CPU and components that are traditionally fabricated off-chip. A well-known example of this is memory stacking on chip. Non-CMOS technologies such as DRAM, phase-change RAM (PRAM) and magnetic RAM (MRAM) [8] can be stacked directly on top of a logic core and integrated using high-density TSVs, overcoming the well-known memory wall problem [9] . Not only do TSVs provide much lower latency than off-chip interconnects, but also provide high density interconnects, hence facilitating wider buses and parallel memory access using multiple memory controllers [9] , [10] . Studies have shown that the performance improvements due to main memory stacking can be up to 2x [9] , [11] .
3D Network on Chip
Network on Chip (NoC) is a communication management system that utilizes novel network topologies and methodologies to interconnect a variety of functional intellectual property (IP) blocks and/or processing units such as processors, memory, and FPGA blocks. It's designed to overcome the bandwidth limitation of traditional hierarchal buses or the lack of scalability in a crossbar interconnect approach. Combining with 3D integration technology, 3D NoC has been shown to provide significant improvements in both latency, throughput and energy efficiency [12] . Due to the mismatch in dimensions between the vertical direction (hundreds of microns) and the planar directions (tens of millimeters), innovative 3D NoC topologies that are more highly connected in the vertical direction have been proposed [10] , [12] .
Fine-Grain 3D Integration
3D integration can be done at different granularities [13] . Coarse-grained 3D integration can be implemented at core level, such as the 3D memory on chip and 3D NoC models as mentioned in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This approach could offer significant improvements to performance and power by removing the memory bandwidth wall, but does not take full advantage of the benefits of 3D ICs. A finer grained functional block level integration allows functional blocks to be distributed across multiple layers, but maintain each functional block as a 2D circuit. This can reduce intra-core wirelength and allow reduced clock period or power [13] . To take this idea even further, 3D integration at the logicgate level (block folding) offers even more savings in power and delay. Block folding involves the implementation of an individual functional block across multiple layers, reducing intra-block delays and power. A recent study [14] of fullchip 3D design of a SPARC chip multiprocessors (CMP) showed that a 3D design using 2D functional blocks can reduce power by 14 percent compared to a baseline 2D design, however when block folding is applied this reduction in power becomes 20 percent. Even finer grained integration at the transistor level (e.g., separate layer for NMOS and PMOS) has been considered [13] , but the ability to manufacture TSVs at the size and pitch required for such a scheme is yet to be realized. Moreover, the reliability and yield implications of such an approach are expected to be prohibitive [15] .
3D IC DESIGN FLOW AND CHALLENGES
A typical 3D IC design flow is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Given a design specification, 3D architectural design space exploration (DSE) is first performed to evaluate a multitude of design choices and choose the one that is optimal. Early estimation of the system's cost, performance, power, thermal and reliability characteristics is made to assist the architectural level decision making. After that, functional design (registertransfer-level abstraction) is performed to represent the logic flow between registers. The functionalities are converted into logic-gate level netlists in the subsequent logic synthesis step. This is followed by 3D physical design, which is mainly composed of power/ground planning, floorplanning, partitioning, placement/routing, and clock network synthesis. It converts the gate-level netlists into physical layouts. The next step is design verification, where layout shapes and electrical parameters are extracted from the physical layout to verify the design rules and functionality. It also ensures that electrical performance (timing, power, IR-drop etc.), thermal behavior, and reliability can meet the design specification.
The increased device density due to multi-layer stacking and the introduction of TSVs pose new concerns and challenges in 3D IC design. Here we summarize five major design challenges in 3D ICs:
Thermal management: The thermal challenge in 3D ICs has two main sources: increased power flux due to stacking and interlayer thermal resistance due to interlayer oxide. Traditional air-cooling is a poor choice for 3D stacking as the cooling capacity can not scale with the number of layers. Various methods of thermally aware design have been proposed to overcome the thermal challenge [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] . Another promising solution is embedded micro-fluidic (MF) cooling, which provides localized cooling to each layer of the stack and can unlock performance increases over 2x [10] . Runtime schemes also fill in the gaps to ensure thermal feasibility in 3D CPUs [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] .
Power delivery: Increased power flux also puts increased stress on the power delivery network (PDN). Vertical interconnects change the electrical properties of the power network. Delivering reliable power to the layers far from the off-chip power pins is significantly difficult. Past works have characterized the 3D PDN with respect to number of power TSVs, number of layers, power/performance tradeoffs and optimal placement/size of decoupling capacitance and on-chip voltage regulators [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] .
Reliability: TSV introduces new failure modes such as TSV electro-migration and stress-migration [29] , thermal cycling [30] , and stress-induced material fracture [31] . These new failure modes and other common device related failure modes [32] such as hot carrier injection (HCI) and negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) are especially worsened in an elevated temperature, which is often the case in 3D ICs. The reliability issues in 3D ICs can be managed during design time and run time. During design-time, redundant TSVs insertion [33] and TSV placement [34] are two commonly used techniques. For run-time approach, task scheduling [35] and task migration [36] can effectively mitigate 3D IC's reliability degradation.
Signal integrity: Signal integrity issues can come about due to cross coupling between TSVs and the silicon substrate in 3D ICs. Studies have shown that unlike planar wires, increasing TSV pitch is not an efficient method for dealing with the signal integrity issue in 3D ICs [37] . Promising solutions to this problem are TSV shielding [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] and differential TSV pairs [42] .
Clock synthesis: Clock tree synthesis is the design of a clock network that connects a clock source to all sequential logics such that the clock wirelength, clock skew/slew and clock power are minimized. Clock TSVs complicate the design of 3D ICs by introducing TSV capacitance, TSV-induced thermal-mechanical stress and TSV failure. State-of-the-art 3D clock tree synthesis algorithms include partition-based approach [43] and greedy method [44] . Besides, the impact of the TSV-induced stress on timing corners was considered in [45] and clock gating techniques were applied to 3D IC to minimize clock power [46] .
These research efforts targeting different 3D IC design challenges ensure the feasibility and reliability of 3D integration technology.
SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN 3D ICS
As 3D integration is becoming a promising technology for next-generation chip design, researchers have started to investigate it from a security perspective. 3D integration has been shown to possess various built-in security advantages in countering different security threats in ICs. These threats take place in different stages of an IC's life cycle, from design, fabrication to post-deployment. In this section, we focus on three security applications of 3D IC technology: supply chain attack prevention, side-channel attack mitigation and trustworthy computing system design. For each application, we describe the security threats, investigate the advantages of 3D IC in thwarting the attacks, and summarize various previously proposed 3D IC based countermeasure techniques.
Supply Chain Attack Prevention
Nowadays, IC designs are increasingly outsourced to an offshore fabrication foundry due to the increasing complexity of modern IC designs and the huge capital expenditure for developing an advanced semiconductor foundry [47] . In order to access advanced semiconductor technology at a lower cost, most IC design companies that once possessed their own foundries are now adopting a fab-less model: they concentrate their resources and efforts on IC designs while outsourcing the fabrication. Although such model is cost-effective, it poses new security threats on the outsourced designs since the offshore foundry might not be trustworthy. Without close monitoring and direct control, the outsourced designs are vulnerable to various attacks. The foundry can reverse-engineer a GDSII layout file to obtain its gate-level netlist (hardware IP), or it can overproduce the IC and sell illegal copies into the market, which are referred to as IP piracy and IC overbuilding [48] , [49] . The economic loss due to piracy and overproduction was estimated up to US $4 billion per year in 2008 and was expected to grow significantly since then [50] . In addition, a malicious foundry can intentionally modify the layout design in order to produce a backdoor [51] or undermine the reliability [52] of the chip, referred to as hardware Trojan insertion. These attacks (also known as supply chain attacks) pose not only an economic risk to commercial IC design companies, but also security threats for sensitive electronic systems.
Attack Model
The supply chain attack model assumes that the attacker is an untrusted foundry that has access to the layout files of a circuit design provided by a fab-less design company. These outsourced layout files are assumed to be correctly and securely designed using trusted Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools for synthesis, partitioning, placement and routing. The attacker has the ability to reverse-engineer the layouts to obtain their gate-level netlists. Moreover, he is also capable of making malicious modifications to the layout files. As shown in Fig. 3 , the supply chain attack consists of three types of attacks based on different attacker's goals: 1) IP piracy: An attacker can reverse-engineer the provided layout files to obtain their gate-level netlist (hardware IPs) using state-of-the-art reverseengineering technique [53] . He then can claim the ownership of the pirated IPs and use them in his own designs or sell them to other IC design companies in order to gain profit. 2) IC overbuilding: The attacker can overbuild the ICs with the already available layout masks and then sell the illegal copies into the market. To reduce cost, these overbuilt ICs might not be subject to a complete testing process. As a result, some unauthorized and low-quality ICs (also known as counterfeit ICs [54] ) may end up being packaged and sold to the market, which renders both economic and reputation loss to the design company. order to achieve certain purposeful attacks such as privilege level escalation and secret key recovery, referred to as targeted HT insertion. Parametric HTs are implemented by modifying the fabrication process parameters that can undermine the reliability or performance of the ICs. The detection of HTs through conventional IC testing is difficult since the HTs are normally designed to be triggered under extremely rare conditions (in the case of functional HTs) [55] or triggered after a relatively long time such as a few year (in the case of parametric HTs) [52] .
New Opportunities with 3D Integration
In 3D integration, multiple functional layers can be fabricated independently on separate substrates and then integrated together into a single chip. This fabrication process offers inherent support for split fabrication, where different layers can be fabricated in different foundries. A designer can choose a portion of the circuit at his discretion and manufacture it in a trusted foundry for security while manufacturing the rest in an untrusted foundry for state-ofthe-art fabrication technology. Because some information will be hidden from the untrusted foundry, 3D split fabrication can prevent the supply chain attacks such as piracy, overbuilding, and hardware Trojans. Two split fabrication strategies of 3D IC have been presented in [56] , [57] . In one embodiment, some active layers are fabricated in a trusted foundry, referred to as trusted tier while others are fabricated in an untrusted foundry, referred to as untrusted tier, as shown in Fig. 4 . With that, the IC designs in trusted tier are not directly accessible to the untrusted foundry and hence they are protected from the supply chain attacks. In another embodiment, all active layers are outsourced to offshore foundries and then securely bonded in a trusted foundry. By doing so, the vertical connections between layers are kept secret. Although the offshore foundry can reverse-engineer the layout of each layer, the resultant incomplete netlist (lacking the inter-layer connections) is incomprehensible if a design is intelligently partitioned into different layers in an obfuscated manner. The second split-fabrication embodiment also applies to the interposer-based 3D IC (2.5D IC) technology [58] , [59] , [60] , a cost-effective transition technology to 3D IC as discussed in Section 2.2. The silicon interposer of a 2.5D IC can be fabricated in the trusted foundry as the trusted tier while the dies are outsourced to offshore foundries as the untrusted tier. The final integration is implemented in the trusted foundry to maintain the secrecy of interconnections in the interposer.
In previous research literature, the "hidden" portion of design in the trusted tier is decided based on two considerations:
Firstly, the trusted tier can withhold a portion of original wires and/or gates that can maximally obfuscate the exposed portion of netlist in the untrusted tier. Without the complete knowledge of the original netlist, it's difficult for an attacker to reverse-engineer the ICs, or identify a specific location for HT insertion. To defend IP piracy and overbuilding, Xie et al. [58] proposed a security-aware physical design flow for 2.5D IC technology, which consists of a secure partitioning phases and a secure placement phase. The secure partitioning generates a bi-partitioning such that the corresponding cut-wires (which will be "hidden" in the interposer) have high controllability and observability in order to better obfuscate the functionality. The secure placement generates obfuscated chip layouts that can withstand the proximity attack [61] , an attack that infers the hidden connection based on the physical proximity of two gates/ pins. Compare to a conventional 2.5D design flow, their approach can achieve 3.87x functionality obfuscation (in terms of Hamming distance) and can mitigate the proximity attack. The obfuscation due to 2.5D split fabrication can also prevent the insertion of targeted HTs, i.e., malicious modification to a specific target gate. Imerson et al. [59] proposed a heuristic wire-lifting algorithm for 2.5D split fabrication to obfuscate the untrusted tier. By lifting and "hiding" sufficient number of wires into the interposer, the proposed technique ensures that every gate in the original netlist can be mapped to at least k indistinguishable gates in the incomplete netlist of the untrusted tier, thereby increasing the attacker's difficulty in identifying the target gate to attack.
Secondly, the trusted tier can obfuscate or conceal various security-critical circuitries such as HT detection sensors in order to protect them from being tampered or removed by the attacker. Recent years have seen a huge proliferation of hardware Trojan detection research based on functionality verification [62] , side-channel signatures [63] , [64] , [65] , builtin-self-authentication (BISA) [66] and so on. Most of these techniques require additional circuits to assist in Trojan activation and/or detection, including dummy flip-flops, sensors and authentication circuits, which are referred to as designfor-security (DfS) circuitries. However, these DfS circuitries may also be tampered or bypassed, which undermines the system's security. With 3D split fabrication, the DfS circuitries can be placed in the trusted tier of a 3D IC and fabricated in a trusted foundry. Narasimhan et al. [64] proposed to use on-chip transient current sensors to detect hardware Trojan and use 3D split fabrication to hide all the current monitors in the trusted tier. It prevents possible malicious modifications that can nullify the sensors, or upsize/downsize the sensors to undermine their measurement accuracy. Bilzor [67] proposed a similar technique that utilizes the trusted tier to conceal an execution monitor, which can detect specification violations of a target processor due to hardware Trojan. To reduce fabrication costs and brings down the semiconductor technology requirement for the trusted foundry, 2.5D technology can be utilized to conceal critical wires of the DfS circuitries (instead of the complete circuitry). In [60] , Xiao et al.proposed an obfuscated BISA (OBISA) technique that conceals critical wires of BISA circuitry [66] into the trusted tier. BISA block is a hardware authentication circuitry which guarantees that when it's modified by HTs, faults can be generated and observed. However, the BISA blocks consist of special circuit structures that are distinguishable from the original functional blocks and hence are subjected to removal by attackers. To make these structures less distinguishable, the author proposed to hide some critical wires of the BISA blocks to the trusted tier using split fabrication and construct an obfuscated BISA block.
Summary and Discussion
2.5D/3D IC technology provides an effective approach to hide partial circuitry into a trusted tier that's fabricated in a trusted foundry, which increases the burden of supply chain attacks (as illustrated in Fig. 5) . A secure split-fabrication enhanced 2.5D/3D IC design flow consists of four phases: logic synthesis, netlist partitioning (wire and/or gate lifting), placement and routing. The core of the design flow is partitioning, which determines the secret information hidden from the attacker. The other three phases also have a significant impact on the security level of the split fabrication, i.e., they affect the difficulty of inferring the hidden information. Overall, it requires a comprehensive analysis and optimization to obtain a secure 2.5D/3D IC design flow to prevent the supply chain attacks.
Notice that the split fabrication strategy can also be applied to conventional 2D IC technology [61] , [68] , [69] , [70] . 2D IC based split fabrication splits a 2D IC into a FrontEnd-Of-Line layer (FEOL) that contains active devices and lower metal layers, and a Back-End-Of-Line (BEOL) layer that contains higher metal layers. The FEOL layer is outsourced to an untrusted foundry for advanced fabrication technology while the fabrication of BEOL layer and final integration are securely implemented in a trusted foundry. Thus, interconnect wires in BEOL layer of a split 2D IC are kept secret from the untrusted foundry. 2D split fabrication requires a new design and fabrication process [69] . The determination of which metal layer to split is a trade-off between security and fabrication cost. Although a low-layer split 2D IC (e.g., split after M1) offers better security since it hides almost all metal wires in the BEOL layer [68] , it has dense connections of small pitch size between the trusted BEOL layer and the untrusted FEOL layer, which requires more precise alignment and integration techniques and hence leads to higher fabrication cost [60] .
Side-Channel Attack Mitigation
While some attacks focus on attacking/modifying the hardware itself, many attacks try to leak valuable information from the system. One example of such valuable information is the secret key in an encryption algorithm. Nowadays encryption is used ubiquitously for the purpose of secure data transfer, identity authentication, etc. It is essential to many financial or military systems. Due to the nature of these systems, leaking the key is disastrous. Modern encryption systems are provably secure against brute-force attacks since it's computationally impossible to try all possible values of the key until the correct one is found. However, it is far from safe yet since side-channel attacks, where information from the physical implementations of the encryption methods is exploited to deduce the key, are still possible. Characteristics such as running time [71] , [72] , power consumption [73] , [74] , and electromagnetic (EM) emission [75] , [76] , [77] have all been utilized to recover the secret key from various encryption methods. In this section, we will go over different side-channel attacks and then investigate what opportunities 3D integration can offer to mitigate these attacks.
Attack Model
Similar to traditional cryptanalysis, we assume that the adversary has a complete description of the encryption protocol and the only thing he is trying to deduce is the secret key. As mentioned previously, almost all encryption algorithms provide security against brute-force attacks, where the adversary only has black-box access (shown in Fig. 6a ) to the encryption system (i.e., the adversary can only observe the output of the system with the input chosen at his discretion). However, in side-channel attacks, the attacker has access to some side-channels in addition to only inputs and outputs. Side-channels are defined as the unintended output channels from the physical implementation of the encryption algorithm [78] . As shown in Fig. 6b , these side-channels include execution time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, sound, visible light, heat, faulty output, etc. Among these side-channels, execution time, power consumption and faulty output are the most exploited and thus [58] . (c) Netlist obfuscation to prevent targeted HT insertion [59] . (d) Security-critical netlist (e.g., build-in-seltauthentication (BISA) circuits) obfuscation to prevent design-for-security circuitries from being identified or removed [60] . Dash circles are additional BISA gates. 
Timing attack is the first studied and most widely applied kind of side-channel attacks. Kocher [79] pioneered the work in the timing attacks. Timing attacks are based on the fact that encryption methods are performed in non-constant time due to performance optimizations. The run time of one encryption usually depends on the key to some extent. For example, consider the square and multiply algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) which is widely used in various encryption methods. Depending on the value of each bit in the secret key s, z ¼ z Ã y mod n may or may not be executed. This leads to variation in execution time. If the attacker somehow can measure the time it takes to perform each iteration of the loop, then the secret key s is leaked.
Another source of the variation in execution time comes from the cache behavior. The point is that a cache-miss takes much more time than a cache-hit. In cache-based timing side-channel attacks, the attacker measures some timing information and relates that to cache-access patterns. Since the cache-access patterns depend on the secret key, the key is eventually leaked from the measured timing information. More details can be found in [72] , [80] .
Power consumption attacks are based on the following observation: the amount of power consumed by a device is influenced by the data being processed [81] . For example, in Algorithm 1, if s i ¼ 1, then z ¼ z Ã y mod n will be executed, resulting in a larger power consumption than s i ¼ 0. Two types of power-based side-channel attacks have been proposed: simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In SPA attacks, the attacker directly observes a system's power consumption and features such as AES rounds may be identified. In DPA attacks, a set of encryptions under the same secret key is performed and the power trace is collected. Then, a statistical method is applied to correlate the measurements to the secret key. Given enough traces, extreme small correlations can be identified and the key can eventually be deduced [73] .
Faulty output is another side-channel that adversaries have widely exploited in the fault injection attacks. Fault injection attacks can be divided into two phases: fault injection and fault analysis [82] . In fault injection phase, a fault (e.g., flip of one bit in one register) is injected into the system using EM radiation, light illumination, focused ion beam, etc. Note that besides intentionally injected faults, unintentional flaws of a hardware system may also occur, which consist of soft errors, dynamic timing errors and hard errors [83] . Soft errors are caused by high-energy particles such as alpha particles and high-energy neutrons from cosmic radiation. Dynamic timing errors are delay violations that are caused by the fabrication process variation of devices or working condition variations such as temperature and supply voltage noise. Hard errors are due to the hardware aging rendered permanently faulty. Although these faults are not introduced by malicious attackers, they inevitably affect a system's reliability and may be exploited by the adversary. Therefore, we also include these types of errors in our fault injection attack model. In the fault analysis phase, the faulty output is analyzed and the secret key is deduced. Consider Algorithm 1 where the adversary injected a stuck-at-one fault into the register holding s at the ith iteration. If the encryption result is correct, the adversary knows that s i ¼ 1, otherwise s i ¼ 0. More details can be found in [82] , [84] , [85] .
Algorithm 1. Square and Multiply: An Algorithm for Side-Channel Attack Illustration
Input: m; n; s Output: S ¼ m s mod n z ¼ 1; y ¼ m; t number of bits in the binary representation of s
New Opportunities with 3D Integration
With heterogeneous integration, stacking structure, high bandwidth and shortened wire length, 3D integration not only boosts system performance, but also unlocks new opportunities to mitigate the side-channel attacks.
The stacking structure of 3D integration offers a natural defense against fault injection attacks. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the first phase of fault injection attacks is to inject faults into the device using light illumination, focused ion beam, etc. By placing the vulnerable tier (e.g., memory) in the lower stack, the stack above it will act as a shield, which may protect the vulnerable tier from being influenced by fault injection techniques. For instance, [86] utilized 3D technology to protect security-sensitive hardware from high-energy partials by concealing them in the inner layers of a 3D chip. Furthermore, the stacking structure enables system designers to stack a monitor tier on top of the original system. The monitor tier may watch the system for any intended faults. For example, in [83] , the authors proposed to stack a redundant processor as a checker on top of a processor using 3D technology to detect random faults in the system under protection. The stacking structure is also a potential mitigation of the power, EM and heat-based sidechannel attacks [87] . Since more elements are integrated on chip, the side-channel will become noisy. It will be much harder for the attacker to capture the targeted signal. In other words, the signal-to-noise ratio for the attacker will be much lower. This requires the attacker to obtain significantly more traces, making the attack much harder, even impossible.
Heterogeneous integration is another benefit enabled by 3D integration. As mentioned in Section 3.1, integrating different types of memories into the system is beneficial for performance. In addition to that, it may also increase system security. Those types of non-CMOS memory that are resilient to differential power attacks or fault injection attacks may now be integrated into the system, which adds resiliency to fault injection attacks. In [88] , the authors propose to integrate resistive RAM (RRAM) into the system to mitigate DPA attacks. The authors propose an architecture with crypto-coprocessors on a dedicated CMOS layer and the associated memory on RRAM layer. The RRAM layer can dynamically reconfigure into a memory or sensing elements and these two cannot be easily distinguished from the power consumption. This obscures the power signals and thus mitigates DPA attacks. RRAM's high susceptibility to voltage variations provides an added advantage for the DPA attacks since it will add more noise to the power sidechannel leakage of the system. Shortened wire-length offered by 3D integration can also mitigate some cache-based timing side-channel attacks. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the basic idea of these attacks is that cache-misses and cache-hits take dramatically different amount of time. Utilizing the memory-on-chip architecture as introduced in Section 3.1, the latency for accessing lower level of cache will be significantly decreased. Thus, the discrepancy between a cache-miss and a cache-hit will be much smaller, which lowers the timing side-channel leakage in these attacks. Shortened wire-length and high bandwidth also make several countermeasures possible because the performance overhead is smaller compared to a 2D setting. In [89] , a 3D IC based cache random-eviction technique was proposed to mitigate cache-based timing side-channel attacks. The authors concluded that with 3D integration, the performance overhead for implementing a secure cache eviction policy is reduced from 25 percent (for 2D CPU and off-chip memory architecture) to about 0 percent (for 3D memory-on-chip architecture).
Summary and Discussion
Side-channel attacks have been demonstrated to be very powerful against many security-critical systems and various countermeasures have been proposed. Although some effort has been made to utilize the characteristics of 3D integration to mitigate the side-channel attacks, more effort is needed to fully exploit the security advantages it can potentially offer. We highlight some of these security advantages as follows. The stacking structure and highdensity nature of 3D integration offer a natural defense for side-channel attacks as it adds significantly more complexity for the attacker to extract a meaningful signal from the background noise. The heterogeneous integration will enable the designer to investigate a broader range of security primitives and integrate them into the system to defend against side-channel attacks. Moreover, the performance overhead of previously proposed countermeasures may be significantly lowered due to shortened wire-length and increased bandwidth of 3D integration.
Trustworthy Computing Systems
One of many security challenges in computing systems is to ensure that software and their data stored on the hardware platform are securely allocated, managed and executed. Nowadays, secret data such as authentication keys and privacy information are collected, processed and exchanged among different devices, which are attractive targets to malicious software based attacks such as unauthorized memory access and malicious modification of execution environment. Conventional computing systems normally rely on their operating system (OS) or hypervisor to monitor and allocate time-share resources (e.g., CPU, memory and buses) to different software from multiple users with different privilege levels. However, modern OS kernels are often complex and have tens of millions of lines of code [90] , which makes it practically impossible to be perfectly designed. Security vulnerabilities in OS kernels have been continuously revealed. For example, 133 Linux OS vulnerabilities have been discovered in 2014 [91] . Malicious software can exploit these vulnerabilities and pose serious security threats such as incorrect code execution, memory corruption and privilege escalation. To mitigate these threats, various software-based and hardware-based protection schemes have been proposed. Software-based approaches [92] , [93] utilize a smallsized, privileged micro-hypervisor to monitor and provide isolation for sensitive software. On the other hand, hardware-based approaches such as secure architectures have been proposed to provide a secure execution environment to protect a program in the presence of external malicious software attacks [94] , [95] , [96] , [97] . Besides, some security functions of OS kernels such as cryptographic primitives can be implemented in hardware [98] . These hardware approaches, although provide better security guarantees, inevitably increase the design and fabrication cost and might undermine the system's performance. Therefore, a low overhead hardware support to alleviate the vulnerabilities of OS kernel is essential for a trustworthy computing system.
Attack Model
The security vulnerabilities of computing systems addressed in this section mainly focus on malicious software that aims at exploiting vulnerabilities in the OS or hypervisor and compromising its isolated environment so as to audit, steal or corrupt critical information in another security-sensitive software. Specifically, this type of attacks can be unauthorized memory accesses, privilege escalation or any malicious modifications to the execution environment. A comprehensive attack model for a computing system in design time, fabrication time and run time is shown in Fig. 7 .
New Opportunities with 3D Integration
3D IC technology offers various security and performance advantages in building a trustworthy computing system. Firstly, the split fabrication ability of 3D IC technology can guarantee the integrity of a hardware root of trust, which is the security foundation of a trustworthy computing system. The hardware root of trust consists of hardware components that are inherently trusted. Every computer system is built with multiple levels of abstraction. Generally, higher layers must trust lower layers, and the hardware root of trust is composed of fundamental hardware components where the chain of trust is built on. For example, a system's root keys shall be kept secret in hardware and the most fundamental security functions shall also be implemented as ROM code or custom hardware to ensure their integrity [94] . However, with the emergence of hardware Trojans introduced by untrusted third-party IP vendors and especially untrusted offshore foundries, the hardware root of trust might be compromised. 3D IC technology can help regaining this hardware root of trust. As described in Section 5.1, different layers of a 3D IC can be fabricated in different foundries and finally integrated by a trusted foundry. In order to prevent malicious modifications, the hardware root of trust can be designed by a trusted design team, and allocated to a trusted tier of 3D IC that's fabricated in a trusted foundry. Although the hardware root of trust can be achieved using an off-chip security module such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [98] , the exposed inter-chip connections make it vulnerable to probing or tampering attacks as reported in [99] , [100] . On the contrary, 3D ICs are less susceptible to tampering or probing since the internal signals across layers are well concealed inside the chip. Delayering or prying the 3D IC to access the internal wires without destroying the chip is virtually impossible.
Secondly, the trusted tier can serve as a customized introspection layer that can ensure secure operations of software running in the untrusted tier. The applications of 3D IC in building trustworthy computing systems have been explored in various research [57] , [87] , [101] , [102] , [103] . In these research works, a 3D IC is constructed with two active layers: an untrusted computation plane and a trusted control plane, which are vertically stacked and connected using a face-to-face 3D integration technology. The computation plane contains a commercial high-performance processor and is outsourced to an untrusted offshore foundry for fabrication. On the other hand, the control plane which functions as an introspection layer is fabricated in a trusted foundry. The control plane can be designed to monitor and detect security-related policy violations [101] , isolate and protect shared hardware resources such as memory and shared-buses [102] , block unintended control and data flows such as malicious auditing between cores [102] , and perform cryptographic functions [87] .
Lastly, compared with 2D technology, 3D IC can significantly reduce the performance cost for hardware-based security approaches. Conventional 2D IC based off-chip and on-chip implementations of security modules will both result in a large performance overhead. 2D off-chip implementation such as TPM requires the utilization of off-chip interconnect buses, which have a high delay and power consumption. 2D on-chip implementation that inserts security modules inside a chip has larger performance overhead than 3D implementation since the former requires longer interconnect wires from the security module to other modules across the whole chip. Moreover, on-chip is not an economical solution for a large segment of customers who don't necessarily need the high-assurance hardware-based security modules. With 3D IC, the performance overhead can be alleviated. The vertical interconnection across layers substantially reduces the interconnect wirelength, and hence can reduce the overall delay and power consumptions. Besides, the control plane can be made optional depending on the security specification of the product [57] .
It offers more flexibility than 2D on-chip implementation and provides an economical solution for system integrators to integrate critical security functions to a small portion of products for special interest groups.
Summary and Discussion
The split fabrication ability and the performance advantages of 3D IC ensure the security and performance of the hardware root of trust, which makes it a favorable and efficient hardware candidate for building a trustworthy computing system. Previous research has proposed to use 3D integration to stack a control plane on a commercial CPU (a computation plane) to monitor and control its behavior. In order to guarantee that the control plane can effectively function without being compromised, it's important to ensure two basic conditions: a) the security and functionality of the control plane are not dependent on the computation plane, and b) the computation plane should not bypass the monitoring and control of the control plane. Huffmire et al. [103] analyzed the security constraints for the design of control plane and computation plane from different perspectives. For example, it stated that the control plane shall function independently without the need of any functions from the computation plane. Also, global networks such as power and clock shall be ensured to supply reliable power and synchronization signals to the control plane to prevent malicious tampering. Moreover, the computation plane shall not be intentionally modified in order to mitigate the monitoring and control from the control plane. To maintain the effectiveness of the control plane, it's important to detect and remove hardware Trojans in the computation plane inserted by untrusted foundries or third-party IP vendors. Potential measures for hardware Trojan detection have been discussed in Section 5.1.
Other Security Opportunities

Reverse-Engineering Prevention
IC Reverse-engineering (RE) is the process of analyzing an ICs internal structures and connections in order to determine how it is designed and how it operates. It's usually performed by an end-user who can obtain the IC from the market. A typical RE flow has five major steps including decapsulation, delayering, imaging, annotation and schematic creation, as described in [53] .
It's believed that the stacking structure of 3D IC is physically more difficult to be reverse-engineered [56] , [57] since it conceals and protects valuable hardware IPs inside firmly stacked substrates. Delayering the 3D IC becomes challenging since the thick and tough substrates are difficult to be etched evenly [56] . Microscopy and imaging will be complicated by the existence of extra layers, bonding materials, and many layers of vertical and horizontal interconnections. Signal probing for functional analysis will be difficult because all active devices and internal wires can be encapsulated soundly inside substrates. The only exposure to the adversary is the primary I/O pins. This significantly limits the adversary's ability to probe inside the chip. Overall, the 3D stacking structure of multiple substrates increases the burden for each stage of state-of-the-art IC reverse-engineering technique [53] , hence preventing the attacker from obtaining the original gate-level netlist.
Heterogeneous Integration of Security Primitives
3D heterogeneous integration can form highly integrated systems by vertically stacking and connecting multiple layers of various materials, technologies, and functional components [104] . The heterogeneous integration enables the integration of novel nano-technology based security primitives with a CMOS processor. In recent years, a huge proliferation of physical unclonable function (PUF) research is based on novel nano-technologies. These include PUF designs based on emerging non-volatile memories such as resistive random access memory (RRAM) [105] , phase change memory (PCM) [106] , and magnetic random access memory (MRAM) [107] . Compared to conventional silicon CMOS-based PUFs such as arbiter PUF, ring-oscillator PUF and SRAM PUF, the novel nano-PUFs offer security advantages such as larger number of challenge-response pairs and better stability and robustness [108] . With 3D heterogeneous integration, mainstream silicon CMOS-based ICs can efficiently access these advanced security hardware primitives. In addition, 3D heterogeneous integration of analog circuits and digital circuits offers potential opportunities for developing high-performance defense and security systems. In [109] , the author proposed a 3D heterogeneous sensor system that combines sensors, preprocessing analog circuitry, digital logic and signal processing modules to build a comprehensive defense and security system. The performance advantages of 3D technology provide improvements in sensor data collection, detection, classification and autonomous decision-making of such systems.
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN 3D ICS
While providing the great promise in terms of performance and security, 3D integration technology might also bring about adverse impacts. In this section, we discuss three potential security vulnerabilities in 3D ICs. [112] . Redundant TSV has been proposed to reduce the yield loss due to TSV defects during fabrication [113] . Additional probe pads are integrated into each die to enable external test access and novel DfT architecture [114] for internal test access has been demonstrated.
Testing for
Side-Channel Based Hardware Trojan Detection
The stacking of multiple active layers has a huge impact on hardware Trojan detection techniques that are based on side-channel sensors such as current and temperature sensors. Due to the stacking structure and high device density nature of 3D ICs, the signal-to-noise ratio for a side-channel is normally small. When the side-channel signal of Trojan is immersed in noise, the differentiation between Trojan-free and Trojan-active ICs becomes difficult. For example, the temperature of a target block under detection might be affected by other devices in adjacent active layers as well as nearby TSV interconnects. Therefore, the accuracy of temperature signature based hardware Trojan detection technique [65] might be impaired in the 3D context. The same problem also manifests for power signature based detection techniques [64] . IR-drop issue is especially problematic in 3D IC because of its high-current density (due to the increased number of integrated devices but a small number of pins and TSVs). Such IR-drop behaves as noise in the power side-channel of Trojan detection. Moreover, additional fabrication process variations due to the complicated fabrication process of 3D IC may also affect the side-channel signatures for different chips to different extents, which further complicates the analysis of sidechannel signals.
Authenticating 3D IC Layers
3D ICs can be designed and fabricated by stacking conventional 2D dies and interconnecting them with TSVs. These 2D layers may contain functional IPs that are provided by third-party IP vendors and may be fabricated by different foundries. The complicated global supply chain introduces new chances for attackers to insert inauthentic (counterfeit and maliciously modified) designs to compromise the performance and security of the whole chip. Thus, a pre-bond testing for each 2D layer before stacking is important. Once all the layers are bonded, it's difficult to detect an inauthentic layer in the middle since the stacking structure of 3D ICs complicates physical testing and electrical testing. However, ICs are nowadays fabricated and tested at offshore foundries in order to obtain high yield at a low cost. If the 2D layers are outsourced to an offshore foundry for fabrication and testing then their testing results might not be trustworthy. Therefore, effective techniques such as secure split-test (SST) [115] shall be developed to ensure a trustworthy prebond testing of these 2D layers. The design of such testing mechanism is more difficult if an IC design is partitioning into multiple layers in gate-level. More design-for-security mechanisms can also be developed to detect and/or isolate the inauthentic layers during runtime.
SECURITY-AWARE 3D IC DESIGN
In Section 4, a performance-driven 3D IC design flow (Fig. 2) has been described, but security remains to be embedded in that process. In this section, we conclude four distinct characteristics of 3D ICs and investigate their impact on the 3D IC design flow. The distinct characteristics, security advantages and challenges of 3D IC design are summarized in Table 1. 1) Stacking structure: The most distinct feature that distinguishes 3D ICs from 2D ICs is the stacking structure. The vertical stacking structure not only offers a natural shield to mitigate side-channel attacks and reverse engineering, but also enables the split fabrication technique to defend the supply chain attacks. 3D partitioning is the core design phase of a securityware 3D IC design because it determines the layer assignment for functional blocks in the stacking structure. A system-level 3D partitioning can protect the security-critical functional blocks by placing them in a trusted inner tier. A gate-level partitioning for 2.5D/3D split fabrication can lift wires and/or gates into the trusted tier that can maximally obfuscate the netlist or functionality. 2) High device density: The high device density natural of 3D ICs add significant complexity to side-channel attacks, but it also makes side-channel based HT detection more difficult. 3D Placement and routing (P&R) is the design phase that can alleviate this problem. Side-channel attack mitigation based P&R algorithms can be developed to reduce the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) by placing more noisy circuitries around cryptographic functional blocks such as crypto-engines. On the other hand, HT detection based P&R algorithms can be implemented to increase the SNR ratio by placing the sensors in a less noisy environment. 3) Reduced interconnect delay/power: By vertically stacking multiple 2D chips, 3D integration improves chip performance and enables new architectures, thereby offering significant potential for the design of secure CPU architectures. High performance-overhead security policies and mechanisms that are once considered impractical in 2D ICs are now becoming viable with 3D integration [89] . A major challenge for secure 3D CPU design is posed by incorporation of security policy into novel architectures enabled by 3D ICs. An effective co-design approach shall be developed to incorporating security advantages in 3D CPUs while leveraging the challenges in power management, thermal dissipation and testing. This requires an accurate characterization and modeling on the impact of various distinct features of 3D ICs on security. 4) Heterogeneous integration: Heterogeneous integration enables mainstream silicon CMOS-based ICs to efficiently access advanced security primitives such as non-silicon PUFs and non-volatile RAMs. At the same time, 3D ICs present new security advantages and challenges for the deisgn of security primitives. For example, 3D ICs offer an additional source of entropy for PUF design such as process variation in TSVs and inter-layer variation [116] , [117] , which do not exist in 2D ICs.
CONCLUSION
While 3D integration is initially developed to overcome the obstacles in device miniaturization, it has presented various security advantages in different security techniques and applications. There is an emerging trend of research exploiting this technology from a security perspective. This paper presents a survey on the current state of 3D integration technology and highlights its opportunities and challenges in [56] , [57] , [58] , [59] , [60] , [64] , [67] ; Mitigate side channel attacks [83] , [86] , [87] ; Prevent reverse engineering [56] , [57] Testing and authentication of counterfeit and Trojan inserted circuits
Lower device density
Higher device density
Mitigate side channel attacks [87] ; Prevent reverse engineering [56] , [57] Higher interconnect delay/power Lower interconnect delay/power Lower performance overhead for aggressive security policies [89] and mechanisms [57] , [87] , [101] , [102] , [103] No on-chip heterogeneous integration
Heterogeneous integration
Support integration of novel security primitives such as non-silicon PUFs and non-volatile RAMs [88] , [105] , [106] , [107] various security applications. It summarizes current research works on 3D integration based security in three major applications including supply chain attack prevention, side-channel attack mitigation and trustworthy computing system design. It also addresses the potential vulnerabilities risen by 3D integration that call for future research efforts. Finally, the paper summarizes the distinct features of 3D ICs, highlight their security advantages/ challenges and discuss their impact on a security-aware 3D IC design. With the effort made in 3D IC security characterization and modeling, future chip designers can take security into consideration at an early phase of the design while optimizing the chip for performance and power.
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